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Abstract
Aging and an increasing retired population are a global challenge. Previous studies
suggest that retirement affects economic behaviors of the retiree and his or her spouse,
including consumption, health outcome, and time use. However, little is known about
the intergenerational effects of parental retirement on adult children. This paper studies
the effects of parental retirement on adult children’s labor supply through intergenera-
tional time and monetary transfer. We exploit the mandatory retirement age in China
as the cut-off point and apply a regression discontinuity (RD) approach to four waves
of the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) Dataset. Our findings suggest that parental
retirement reduces adult children’s annual hours of labor supply by 3 to 4 percent. This
reduction is especially pronounced for female children. We find that the reduction can
be explained by parents’ increasing demand for time and care from children due to the
significant drop in parents’ self-rated health upon retirement. Although both male and
female children increased their monetary and time transfers to parents, we find that
parents tend to make more transfers to sons compared to daughters. Daughters are
also more likely to make transfers to parents after they retire, both in terms of money
and in terms of time. We therefore urge policy makers to increase formal eldercare
provisions and provide workplace amenities such as flexible working hours, especially
for female employees.
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1 Introduction
Aging and increasing retired population are a global challenge. Virtually every country in
the world is experiencing growth in both the size and the proportion of older persons in
the population. In 2019, there were 703 million persons aged 65 years or over in the global
population. This number is projected to double to 1.5 billion in 2050. Globally, the share
of the population aged 65 years or over increased from 6 per cent in 1990 to 9 per cent in
2019. This proportion is projected to rise further to 16 per cent in 2050, when it is expected
that one in six people worldwide will be aged 65 years or over (UN World Population Ageing
2019)1. A concurring problem with aging is retirement. Since a retired person either relies
on public programs (such as pension system) or assistance from family members, the rising
number of older persons can intensify the pressure on their families, especially in countries
where public transfers are relatively low.
Research has found that retirement not only affects the retiree but also the economic
behaviors of the spouse, for example income and consumption behavior (Charles, 2004;
Battistin et al., 2009), leisure activities (Stancanelli and Soest, 2016), home production
(Stancanelli and Soest, 2012), cognitive abilities (Mazzonna and Peracchi, 2012) and health
and health behavior (Coe and Lindeboom, 2008; Johnston and Lee, 2009; Coe and Zamarro,
2011; Behncke, 2012; Insler, 2014; Eibich, 2015). Studies on the intergenerational effects of
retirement, in particular the effect of parental retirement on adult children’s labor supply,
remain scarce. Bertrand et al. (2003) examine how the pension transfer paid to parents affects
the labor supply of prime-age individuals living with these elderly in extended families in
South Africa. They find a sharp drop in the working hours of prime-age individuals in these
households when women turn 60 years old or men turn 65, the ages at which they become
eligible for pensions. In addition, the oldest son in the household reduces his working hours
more than any other prime-age household member. Recent research finds that in Europe
parental retirement increases fertility rate and women’s retirement leads to an increase in
their daughters’ employment in countries with low family benefits, while the opposite is true
in high family-benefits countries (Eibich and Siedler, 2020; Fenoll, 2020). In the Chinese
context, Chen and Zhang (2018) find that maternal retirement decreases female children’s
childcare time by eight hours per week. At the same time, the retirement of mothers/in-
law significantly increases the employment rate of women with children by 12%. There
are, however, two major limitations of the existing literature. First of all, it only looks at
1https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/ageing/
WorldPopulationAgeing2019-Report.pdf
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the extensive margin of female labor supply, namely, the binary definition of whether the
woman is working or not, without looking at the actual hours. It is entirely possible that
adult female children’s labor participation rate increased but the average hours decreased,
which is a net negative effect. Second, the study focuses narrowly on the effect of maternal
retirement on female children without examining either the effect of paternal retirement or
the heterogeneous effects of parental retirement on female and male children.
Another intriguing question to explore, especially for Asian countries like China where
gender role is clearly defined and salient, is whether parental retirement affects male and fe-
male children’s labor supply differently. Pioneering research by Akerlof and Kranton (2000),
for example, suggests that men and women are associated with different behavioral pre-
scriptions, such as “men work in the labor force and women work in the home”. Such pre-
scriptions may simultaneously affect hours of market labor supply and the division of tasks
within households, such as childcare and eldercare. Budig and England (2001) find that the
burden of childcare often falls disproportionally on women. Ettner (1995) uses data from
the 1986-1988 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and shows
that informal care-giving has a significant negative effect on female market labor supply in
the U.S.. In particular, coresidence with a disabled parent has a large and significant nega-
tive impact on female labor supply, although most of this effect is due to non-participation
in the labor force rather than to a reduction in hours among workers. Ettner argues that
the asymmetrical effect of eldercare on male and female can be explained by social norms
“making decisions to substitute nonmarket for market labor more difficult for men.” The
effect of gender identity on female labor supply and home production is particularly relevant
in the case of China, where the society is in a transition period in terms of social norms.
Although the rate of female labor force participation in China is relatively high, this rate is
gradually decreasing: the participation rate for the females was 91% in 1990, 87.6% in 2000,
and 83.2% in 2010 (Li et al., 2015). This might indicate that Chinese women are finding it
more challenging to balance work and family responsibilities.
This paper studies the effects of parental retirement on adult children’s labor supply and
explores the mechanism of such effects through the change in intergenerational time and
monetary transfers. We use four waves of the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS), which is
representative of 95 percent of the Chinese population and provides detailed information on
birth year and month, hours worked, retirement status and other demographic information.
To identify causal relationship, we apply a regression discontinuity (RD) design to examine
the effect of reaching the mandatory retirement age (60 years old for men, 55 years old for
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women in SOE, 50 years old for women in private enterprises). We find a sizable increase in
actual retirement rate at the mandatory age cut-off, indicating high compliance rate to the
retirement policy.
We find that there is a drop of 77 to 82 hours per year in adult children’s labor supply
at parents’ mandatory retirement age, which is equivalent to a 3 to 4 percent drop in annual
average hours. This effect is statistically significant and robust to the inclusion of self-
employed workers who enjoy more flexible working schedule as well as alternative model and
time window specifications. We also find a significant increase in the probability of adult
children transferring time and money to retired parents. Adult children are 3.8 percent and
4.5 percent more likely to transfer money and time respectively to parents after they retire.
We propose two possible explanations. First, due to social convention and the lack of formal
eldercare programs in China, adult children are the primary caregivers for their parents and
need to shoulder the majority of time and monetary burden. Second, there seems to be
an increasing demand for care from parents post retirement since we find a significant drop
in parents’ self-rated health level after retirement. This is consistent with findings in the
literature that parents tend to believe that they are less healthy and require more attention
from caregivers when transitioning into retirement life (Mu¨ller and Shaikh, 2018; Fitzpatrick
and Moore, 2018). We also find that the drop in hours is driven by parents who self-rated
as less healthy.
In addition, we find that the decrease in working hours is more salient for daughters
than for sons. Controlling for children’s own age and year fixed effects, daughters annual
hours of labor supply decrease by 123.7 hours from an average of 2,138.67 hours (6 percent),
which is sizable and significant at the level of 1 percentage point. In comparison, sons only
experienced a statistically insignificant decrease of 49.05 hours. This is consistent with the
findings in the gender role literature where daughters are more likely to devote time into
care-giving within the household. Likewise, although the probability of parents making time
and monetary transfer to children also increased after retirement, we find that daughters are
less likely to receive such transfers than sons. Such disparate transfer pattern can be ex-
plained by social norm and traditional gender role. Chinese parents favor sons over daughters
(Ebenstein, 2010) and sons are considered as the “family name bearer”. Therefore, parents
are more likely to give money to and do housework for sons. Moreover, the disproportional
care provided by daughters can also be explained by gender role. Traditionally men and
women are associated with specific behavioral prescriptions as “the bread winners” and “the
home makers” respectively. The effect of gender identity on female labor supply and home
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production is particularly relevant a society is in a transition period in terms of social norms
like China. Chinese women are found to be spending twice the time fathers do on childcare,
indicating that it has become more challenging for Chinese women to balance work and fam-
ily responsibilities (Chen and Zhang, 2018). Since it is costly to deviate from social norms
or gender identity, such prescriptions reinforce daughters to carry more duty on taking care
of and providing help to parents (Budig and England, 2001; Ettner, 1995).
Our paper has three major contributions. First, we add to the aging and retirement
literature by examining the spillover effects of retirement. In particular, we study the effects
of parental retirement, both paternal and maternal, on both male and female adult children’s
labor supply. In addition, we further investigate the underlying mechanism behind such
changes by examining intergenerational transfers – money and time – both downward (from
parents to children) and upward (from children to parents). By doing so, we are able to
not only examine the gender difference in terms of the externality of retirement but also
identify the gender difference within each channel of such impacts. We provide new evidence
on the negative impacts of the drop in parental self-rated health upon retirement on adult
children’s labor supply, which has not been examined in the past literature. Second, we add
to the gender inequality literature by examining the complex interplay among gender identity,
care-giving, and female labor supply in China. Using parental retirement as an exogenous
shock, we are able to estimate how male and female adult children response differently to the
increased needs for eldercare, how male and female adult children give and receive monetary
and time support from parents disproportionately, and how such inequalities affect male and
female children’s hours of market supply differently. Third, our results call for policy reform
that addresses the negative effects of parental retirement on adult children, especially on
women. An affordable public elderly care system may help reduce the burden of prime age
adults, increase overall labor supply and therefore tax base, and boost economic development
in the end. In addition, workplace policies designed to help women employees specifically,
for example flexible hours, will also help female adult children adjust their schedules, take
care of their parents without negatively affecting their job performances.
This paper proceeds in seven sections. In Section 2, we give background on the aging,
mandatory retirement and eldercare in China. In Section 3, we describe the data and the
sample construction. In Section 4, we conduct the analysis accessing the change in adult chil-
dren’s labor supply due to parental retirement and heterogeneous effects by gender. Section
5 explores the mechanisms. Section 6 provides robustness checks using alternative model
specification and alternative time window specification. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Aging, Mandatory Retirement and Eldercare in China
China has the largest population and faces the fastest growing aging population (United
Nations, 2019). The old-age dependency ratio, defined as the number of people at retirement
age per 100 working people, increases from 10 percent in 2000 to 17 percent in 2020. The
share of the population over 60 years of age is now projected to rise from 17.4 percent in 2020
to 30 percent in 2040, while the fertility rate will continue to remain low (United Nations,
2019). This is mainly due to decades of falling birth rates and steeply rising life expectancy.
At the same time, China has been implementing the mandatory retirement policy since 1978
and is one of the countries with the earliest retirement age. For workers in private enterprises,
men and women are supposed to retire at the age of 60 and 50 respectively. In sectors such
as public sectors, state-owned enterprises (SOE) and collectively-owned enterprises (COE),
the mandatory retirement for men and women are 60 and 55 respectively.
The combination of aging and mandatory retirement placed huge pressure on Chinese
families. In China, families have been the main source of financial support and care-giving
for the elderly. Nearly 75 percent older adults have children living with them or residing
nearby who can provide care (Lei et al., 2015) 2. Studies suggest that only 3% of the elderly
have a commercial pension and 0.2% a private occupational pension issued by a private
employer in 2013 (Zhu and Walker, 2018).
Policy makers in China have made several attempts to tackle the many aging and care-
giving related issues, including proposing a “three tiers of social services for the aged” –
home-based care as the “basis,” community-based services as “backing,” and institutional
care as “support.” A series of national policy initiatives over the last decade attempted to
develop community-based services. A notable example was the Starlight Program, under
which the government invested a total of 13.4 billion yuan (roughly US $2.1 billion) to build
urban community-based senior services centers during 2001–04. However, the centers have
apparently not served their intended purpose partly because of dwindling financial support
from the government, raising questions about the viability of similar initiatives. To date,
self-sustaining, community-based long-term care services remain largely nonexistent, except
in a few major urban centers like Shanghai (Wu et al., 2005). In addition, policy initiatives
to support home or community-based care have been largely limited to urban areas, and even
there, the number of beneficiaries is still relatively small. In much of rural China, institutional
elder care was rare and limited to state-run institutions exclusively serving childless elderly
2About 41% of older adults live with an adult child, and another 34% have an adult child living nearby.
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adults, orphans, the mentally ill, and developmentally disabled adults without families in
2000s (Feng et al., 2012).
With insufficient formal care programs, adult children still act as the primary caregiver
to retired parents. That is, adult children have no choice but to provide significant time and
monetary transfers to retired parents.
3 Data
Our data comes from four waves of the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS), the represen-
tative household survey for year 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016, respectively. The CFPS sample
covers 25 provinces/municipalities/autonomous regions, representing 95% of the Chinese
population. At the individual level (i.e. each household member), the survey collects in-
formation on demographic information including birth year and month, gender, and an
urban/rural indicator. It also includes information on individual’s smoking and drinking
behavior in recent months, self-rated health status, retirement status, marital status, edu-
cation level, employment status, annual hours worked, job type (waged/agricultural), sector
(state-owned/collectively-owned/private), and annual income for both parents and adult
children. At the household level, the survey collects information on total assets, family size,
and number of kids under age 16.
Sample Construction We construct a child-centric sample where each observation is an
adult child for year 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016. First, we match each adult child to his or
her first-retired or first-to-retire parent. For example, if person X ’s mother retired in 2011
and her father retired in 2013, we will pair X with her mother. This is because the effect of
the second retirement within the same household tend to be attenuated by the first shock
of retirement. To avoid such bias, we only look at the first retirement that occurred to each
adult child. For consistency, only the first-to-retire parent is included on the left hand side of
the cut-off. For example, if in 2012, person X ’s mother is three years away from retirement
and her father is two years away from retirement, we will pair X with her father. To simplify
our language when referring to one’s first-retired or first-to-retire parent in later sections, we
term it “parent” for convenience. For adult children who are married, we also include his or
her spouse in the sample, pairing the spouse with the same retired parent in the household.
Second, we exclude people who do not report working hours and those who only engage
in their own agricultural production. About 72.3 percent of non-agricultural workers report
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working hours, whereas only 26.7 percent of agricultural workers who do temporary paid job
and earn wages report working hours. Third, we focus on the sample of individuals with
non-missing working hours and whose parents’ ages are within a certain window around
the mandatory retirement age. This is because the identification strategy we use – RD
design – requires a small window around the cutoff to deliver the local treatment effect of an
exogenous shock. Details about the RD design are discussed in section 4. However, there is
no statistical or econometric consensus on the choice of window size. The rule of thumb is
to select a window size narrow enough to ensure the local-ness of the estimates, but not so
narrow that the sample size becomes too small. Here, we choose five years below and above
the cut-off so as to balance the sample size and the local-ness of the estimates. We use seven
years below and above the cut-off as a robustness check in section 6 and the main results
stay valid.
In terms of intergenerational transfers, we observe both monetary and time transfers on
the extensive margin. Namely, we observe the occurrence of time and monetary transfers,
but not the frequency or amount of such transfers. In the survey, questions such as “Did you
give money/care/financial management to parent in the past six months?” and “Did you
give monetary support/housework help/financial management to your child [1/2/3/4/...]?”
provide us with information on the occurrence of intergenerational transfers. For the latter
question for parents, we observe each parent’s response for each of his or her own biological
child, who is assigned a unique child ID. For upward transfers from adult child to parent,
we match each adult child’s answer to the child-centric sample using his or her person ID.
For downward transfers from parent to each adult child, we match parent’s answer to the
child-centric sample using the child ID nominated by the first retired parent.
We code answers to the transfer questions as binary variables to indicate the probability of
parent providing (receiving) care and money to (from) any specific adult child. For example,
if person X answers “yes” to“Did you give money to parent in the past six months?”, then
his or her “Ever transfer to parent – Money” variable would be coded as one, zero otherwise.
Similarly, if a first-retired or first-to-retire parent answers “yes” to “Did you give monetary
support to your child [3]?” and person X’s ID matches that of child [3], then his or her
“Ever receive from parent – Money” variable would be coded as one, zero otherwise.
Summary Statistics Table 1 describes the key features of our constructed sample. 41
percent of adult children are female and the average age is 28.93 years old. 56.3 percent
of the adult children reside in urban areas. On average they have more than 10 years of
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education. Average net asset holding is about 321,000 RMB, which includes house, car, and
financial assets minus debts. 61 percent of the adult children in our sample have kids. The
majority of the kids are between 6 and 16 years old.
Parental age is re-coded so that 60 is set as the “reference cut-off” for both mother and
father. For example, if a mother is 53 years old and works for a private enterprise (meaning
that her mandatory retirement age is 50), we re-code her age as 63 using the formula 53+(60-
50)=63. Similarly, if a mother is 67 years old and worked for a SOE (meaning that her
mandatory retirement age is 55), we re-code her age as 72 using the formula 67+(60-55)=72.
The average re-coded parental age is 58.2 years old, which is just around the 60-year-old
“reference cut-off”. About 30 percent of adult children in our sample have at least one
retired parent. On average, they work for 2,583.57 hours per year, or around 49 hours per
week.
Table 1 panel B shows the average probabilities of upward and downward transfers.
Interestingly, adult children are more likely to transfer money to parents (3.9 percent) than
providing care or housework (2.5 and 2.6 percent). On the contrary, parents are more likely to
do housework for adult children (4.7 percent) than providing financial support (1.8 percent).
4 Assessing the Change in Adult Children’s Labor Sup-
ply Due to Parental Retirement
To estimate the change in adult children’s labor supply due to parental retirement, we
compare the annual hours of labor supply of adult children whose parents’ ages are right
above the mandatory retirement age to those right below the cut-off. Parental retirement
decision could be affected by unobserved factors that could simultaneously affect the adult
children’s labor supply, for example, valuation for family time, work ethics, etc. Thus, to
reach a causal inference, we use a Regression Discountinuity (RD) design to eliminate the
potential endogeneity of parental retirement decisions.
The RD design has been used in previous literature studying the causal effect of reaching
retirement age on health insurance coverage, mortality, and spousal health outcome (Card
et al., 2008; Fitzpatrick and Moore, 2018; Shigeoka, 2014; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). The
RD approach aims to compare the average outcomes just below and just above the cut-off.
As discussed in Section 3, there is no statistical or econometric consensus on the choice of
window range. Here, we choose five years as the window to balance both the sample size
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: Adult Children
Mean SD N
Panel A
Female 0.411 0.49 7565
Age 28.931 5.11 7565
Urban Area 0.563 0.50 7245
Married 0.696 0.46 7565
Years of schooling 10.539 3.88 7204
Net asset (thousand RMB) 321.36 1176.42 7115
Have kids 0.612 0.49 7565
N. kids 1.486 0.80 4626
N. kids under age 1 0.095 0.30 4626
N. kids age 1-2 0.317 0.51 4626
N. kids age 3-5 0.453 0.60 4626
N. kids age 6-16 0.621 0.75 4626
Parent Age (recode) 58.207 3.53 7565
Engage in Non-agricultural work 0.977 0.15 6525
Parent Retired(a) 0.302 0.46 5,618
Parent Retired(b) 0.257 0.44 15,498
Panel B
Hours
Annual hours worked 2583.57 1203.76 7565
Annual hours worked plus self employed 2415.86 1120.003 7799
Transfers
Whether give [..] in the past 6 months
Money to parent 0.039 0.19 4773
Housework to parent 0.025 0.16 4773
Care to parent 0.026 0.16 4773
Financial management to parent 0.003 0.06 4773
Money to support children 0.018 0.13 4773
Housework children 0.047 0.21 4773
Financial management to children 0.005 0.07 4773
Note: One unit of observation is one adult child. This table reports the characteristics of adult children
with non-missing working hours and whose parents’ re-coded ages are within the ± 5 years window. Par-
ent Retired (a) is the fraction of adult with non-missing working hours. Parent Retired(b) is the fraction
of adults with or without missing working hours.
and the localness of the estimates3.
In addition, “age RD design” involves a distinct feature from the standard RD design.
Since all individuals will eventually pass the retirement age, assignment to treatment is
inevitable. Hence, individuals who anticipate the parental retirement may adjust their be-
havior ahead of time (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). If adult children anticipate potential change
in lifestyle, for example a reduction in overall family income, they would increase their labor
supply before the parental retirement, which would lead to an upward bias in our estimate
3We also use seven year as robustness checks and the main results stay similar.
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of the effects of parental retirement on adult children’s labor supply. On the contrary, adult
children may predict that their job performance will be negatively affected by parental retire-
ment anyways and start to work fewer hours before the actual retirement, which would lead
to a downward bias of our estimate. To test if our results are in fact biased by such anticipa-
tion effects, we run a “donut hole” RD as a robustness check in Section 6, where we exclude
observations within one year above or below the threshold (Shigeoka, 2014; Mazumder and
Miller, 2016).
The mandatory age provides an exogenous shock to retirement decisions. Figure 1 shows
that retirement rate has a sizable jump right around the cut-off. There is a clear increase in
the retirement rate for both male and female, suggesting that people are indeed complying
to the mandatory retirement policy. Thus, our RD estimates can be interpreted as valid
intent-to-treatment effects of parental retirement on adult children’s labor supply, as long
as other observed factors affecting parental retirement do not change discontinuously right
around the cut-off. We test this condition with the validity check in Section 4.2.
Figure 1: Fraction of Parental Retirement and Parent Age Relative to the Mandatory Cutoff
Note: This figure shows the compliance rate of parents. The x-axis is parental age relative to mandatory
retirement age (The mandatory retirement age for is 50 for general female workers and 55 for females who
work in public sectors, state-owned enterprises and collectively-owned enterprises; 60 for male workers).
The y-axis is the fraction of people whose reported employment status is “retired”. The blue circles repre-
sent female while the red dots represent male.
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4.1 Graphical Result
Figure 2 shows the scatter plots of adult children’s annual working hours overlaid with lines
from local linear regressions in a window of ±5 years around the mandatory retirement cut-
off. Panel (a) clearly reveals a significant drop in adult children’s average annual hours as
soon parents reach the mandatory retirement age.
It is possible that people develop different working schedules as they age, and that the
reported hours could be systematically different across years. To remove the effects of adult
childrens’ own age and year fixed effects, we also plot the residual annual hours predicted
from the following model (model 1):
Hit = α1Ageit + ηt + νi (1)
where Hit is adult i’s annual hours of labor supply, Ageit is adult i’s own age, and ηt is
year fixed effects. Residual Hˆit from model 1 is the residual annual hours which partial out
any other potential effects and focus on the impact of parental retirement alone. Figure 2
panels (b) and (c) illustrate the residual annual hours against years from or to the parental
retirement. We fit a linear model in Panel (b) and use a non-parametric triangular kernel
approach in Panel (c).
After removing the effect of own age and year fixed effects as suggested in Panel (b)
and Panel (c), the drop in annual residual hours around the cut-off becomes even more
pronounced. Our graphical results therefore clearly shows a significant discontinuity in adult
children’s working hours at the threshold.
4.2 Regression Results
Following similar study designs in the literature (Lee and Lemieux, 2010; Card et al., 2008;
Shigeoka, 2014), we employ a Regression Discontinuity (RD) approach using the mandatory
retirement age as the cut-off. Our main regression equation is as follows:
Hit = β1Postit + β2Runningit + β3Postit ×Runningit + Ageit + ηt + εi (2)
where
Postit = 1{Runningit ≥ 0}
Runningit = max{R
dad
it , R
mom
it }
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(a) Annual hours: Linear
(b) Residual hours: Linear (c) Residual hours: Local polynomial
Figure 2: Adult Child Annual hours and Parental Mandatory Retirement
Note: The x-axis is the re-coded parental, with zero corresponding to the mandatory retirement cut-off. In
figure (a), the y-axis is adult children’s annual hours of labor supply. Dots are means in 1-year bins. The
red and blue lines are fitted from two separate linear regressions, one using data points above the cut-off
and the other using data points below the cut-off. In figure (b) and (c), the y-axis is the residual annual
hours of labor supply predicted from regression Hit = α1Ageit + ηt + νi. In (b), dots are means in 1-year
bins.The red and blue lines are fitted from two separate linear regressions, one using data points above the
cut-off and the other using data points below the cut-off. In (c) dots are means in 1-year bins. The red
and blue lines are fitted from two separate local linear regressions using a triangular kernel with a 0.74-
year bandwidth, one using data points above the cut-off and the other using data points below the cut-off.
R
g
it = Age
g
pt − C
g, g = {dad,mom}
where subscripts i and p denote adult child and parent respectively. Model 2 is child-
centric, where the dependent variable and regressors are defined from the perspective of each
adult child. Hit is the outcome variable – adult child i’s annual hours of labor supply in
year t. C is the mandatory retirement age and varies by gender and occupation, which is
individual- and time-invariant. Agegpt is the adult child i’s father’s age and mother’s age,
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and Rgit is the distance between i’s mother or father’s age and the mandatory retirement age.
Our running variable, Runningit, picks the greater of R
dad
it and R
mom
it – namely, only the
first-retired or first-to-retire parent’s information will be included in our regression. Postit
is a dummy variable that takes value one if the individual i’s first-retired or first-to-retire
parent has reached the cut-off C in year t. We include the interaction term of Post and
the running variable Runningit to allow for different slopes below and above the cut-off.
Ageit is adult child i’s own age in year t. To capture differential economic condition and
measurement discrepancy across survey years, we include year fixed effects ηt. εi is an i.i.d
distributed error term. The parameter of interest is β1, which captures the change in adult
child’s annual hours of labor supply due to parental retirement.
Validity Checks One key assumption of the RD design is that other pre-determined
characteristics of the parents are smooth at the cut-off. Pre-determined variables include
parents’ marital status, gender, years of education, number of kids, whether they are frequent
smokers or drinkers, and whether parents are covered by the pension system. Figure A1 in
the Appendix shows the scatter plots of the above variables, overlaid with lines from local
linear regressions using data within our ±5 years window. The graphs show no visible
discontinuities at the cut-off, indicating that local assignment around the cut-off is random.
Table A2 in the Appendix shows the corresponding statistical test results. We find no
significant changes at the cut-off, which confirms that the pre-determined covariates are
smooth4. Overall, the RD validity checks support our empirical strategy and provide no
evidence of violations of the key identifying assumptions.
Results Table 2 reports the baseline results from model 2. Column 1 suggests that on
average parents are significantly more likely to retire once they pass the mandatory age.
This correlation corresponds to the clear jump in the retirement rate in Figure 3. Columns 2
and 3 suggest that adult children’s hours decrease by about 77 to 82 hours in a year, which
is equivalent to a 3 to 4 percent drop from the annual average. The estimates are precise
and significant at the level of one percentage point. In Column 2, we measure the dependent
variable by considering the annual working hours for people who work in hired jobs. This
includes both waged workers in urban areas and seasonal hired workers in rural areas. To
make our analysis more general, we include self-employed adult children in our sample and
4We also check children’s pre-determined characteristics including marital status, gender, years of educa-
tion, number of kids. The results are shown in Figure A2 and Table A3 in the Appendix. Again we find no
significant discontinuities at the cut-off.
13
Table 2: Baseline: Adult Children Hours Worked Around Parental Retirement
(1) (2) (3)
Hours
Dep. var. Parent Retired Hired jobs Hired plus Self-employed
Post 0.17*** -81.50*** -77.22***
(0.013) (27.63) (27.37)
Running 0.01*** -2.86 -2.48
(0.002) (10.82) (11.15)
Running x Post 0.038*** 14.86 13.43
(0.004) (17.67) (16.05)
Agec 12.47*** 17.05***
(2.26) (2.443)
Constant 0.001 2,041*** 1,910***
(0.008) (75.90) (84.81)
R-squared 0.206 0.103 0.068
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
windows 5 5 5
Observations 15,498 7,573 7,799
Note: One unit of observation is a parent in column 1 and an adult child in column 2 and 3. “Parent Re-
tired” is a dummy variable that takes value one if the parent’s employment status is “retired” and zero
otherwise. The dependent variable in Column 2 is the annual hours for hired jobs. The dependent vari-
able in Column 3 is the annual hours of hired job plus self-employment hours. “Post” is a dummy variable
that takes value one if an adult’s first-to-retire parent has reached the mandatory retirement age and zero
otherwise. “Running” is the first-to-retire parent’s age minus the his or her corresponding mandatory re-
tirement age. “Ageit” is the age of the adult child i’s own age in year t. Year fixed effects are included
in all columns. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by adult child birth year. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
report our regression results in Column 3. It’s interesting to note that column 3 shows a
smaller drop in hours of labor supply, meaning that self-employed adults experience a less
significant negative effect. It is likely that the self-employed have more flexibility in their
schedules so they can more easily accommodate the need to take care of parents without
reducing total hours.
4.3 Heterogeneous Effects on Male and Female Children
In addition to the overall effect of parental retirement on adult children’s labor supply, we
are also interested in exploring if male children (sons and male spouses) and female children
(daughters and female spouses) are affected differently. For this purpose, We re-run the
baseline analysis in Model 2 for men and women separately.
Table 3 reports our gender-specific results. In columns 1 and 2, we include adult children
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who reported hours in hired jobs, while in columns 3 and 4 we also include self-employed
individuals. Column 1 shows that after controlling for own age and year fixed effects, women’s
annual hours decreases by 123.7 hours from an average of 2,138.67 hours, which is equivalent
to a 6 percent drop (p < 0.01). Column 2, however, shows a statistically insignificant change
in men’s annual hours. When we include self-employed individuals in columns 3 and 4, the
sample sizes for both men and women slightly increase. As shown in column 3, women’s
hours decreases by around 89 hours, which is equivalent to 4 percent of the annual average.
Men’s hours as shown in Column 4, however, has not change significantly.
It is surprising that there is a significant difference in women and men’s labor supply
responses to parental retirement. However, this finding is consistent with other related find-
ings in the the social norm and gender role literature where women are expected to perform
more family duties compared to men. Traditionally men and women are associated with
specific behavioral prescriptions as “the bread winners” and “the home makers” respectively
(Budig and England, 2001; Ettner, 1995). It is possible that women suffers the burden due
to the duty reinforced by social norms or gender identity. If this is the case, we expect to
see differential transfer patterns between daughters and sons.
In sum, we find that overall there is a 3 to 4 percent drop in adult children’s annual hours
of labor supply when their parents retire. This reduction is more salient for daughters or
female spouses than for sons or male spouses. In the next section, we explore possible expla-
nations for the drop and for the gender-specific effects by studying the time and monetary
transfer patterns between parents and children.
5 Mechanism of the Change in Adult Children’s Labor
Supply
In this section, we explore the underlying mechanism that helps explain the changes in adult
children’s labor supply due to parental retirement. We examine changes in monetary and
time transfers between adult children and their parents, which could be caused by changes
in living arrangement and changes in parental health.
5.1 Time and Money Transfers
Due to retirement, parents would experience a drop in income and consequently consump-
tion. Conforming to social norm, children would have the incentive to transfer money to
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Table 3: Adult Children Hours Worked Around Parental Retirement: By Gender
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hours in hired jobs Hours hired plus SE
Dep. var. Women Men Women Men
Post -123.70** -49.05 -88.92* -62.31
(50.02) (45.28) (50.09) (49.66)
Running 5.45 -9.61 2.93 -5.77
(16.56) (10.66) (17.35) (11.36)
Running x Post 24.58 12.54 22.45 10.02
(26.35) (17.47) (28.12) (16.00)
Agec 7.57* 11.85*** 11.67*** 15.84***
(4.13) (2.87) (4.07) (3.01)
Constant 2,139*** 2,079*** 2,009*** 1,973***
(112.10) (105.50) (112.20) (112.00)
R-squared 0.110 0.103 0.069 0.072
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
windows 5 5 5 5
Observations 3,110 4,455 3,197 4,669
Note: One unit of observation is an adult child. The dependent variables in Columns 1 and 3 are the
annual hours of labor supply in hired jobs. The dependent variables in Columns 2 and 4 are the annual
hours in hired job plus the self-employment hours. “Post” is a dummy variable that takes value one if an
adult’s first-to-retire parent has reached the mandatory retirement age and zero otherwise. “Running” is
the first-to-retire parent’s age minus the his or her corresponding mandatory retirement age. “Ageit” is
the age of the adult child i’s own age in year t. Year fixed effects are included in all columns. Standard er-
rors are reported in parentheses and clustered by adult child birth year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
support their parents(Bertrand et al., 2003). At the same time, due to the lack of formal
eldercare system, adult children have to act as primary caregivers and parents may prefer
to compensate children with money for their provision of care (Antonucci, 1990; Bernheim
et al., 1985; Brandt and Deindl, 2013).
With an increase in parents’ leisure time, we may expect that parents would help chil-
dren more with housework, which would lead to an increase children’s labor supply. How-
ever, papers in the past have shown that parents experience physical and mental decline
when transitioning to retirement (Mu¨ller and Shaikh, 2018; Fitzpatrick and Moore, 2018).
Therefore, it is possible that parents would need more support from adult children once they
retire, especially at the beginning of this transition. To explore the changes in intergenera-
tional transfer patterns, We replace the dependent variable in Model 2 with various transfer
measures and estimate the following linear probability model:
Yit = γ1Postit + γ2Runningit + γ3Postit ×Runningit + Ageit + η˜t + ε˜c (3)
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where Yit = {CareCit, CarePit} is the set of transfer variables. To be consistent with the
baseline Model 2, Model 3 is also specified as child-centric, where the dependent variables
and regressors are defined from the perspective of each adult child. Dependent variable
CareCit is a dummy variable that takes value one if adult child i provided care or monetary
transfer to his or her parent in the past six months in year t, and zero otherwise. Similarly,
CarePit is a dummy variable that takes value one if adult child i received time or monetary
transfer from parents in the past six months in year t, and zero otherwise. Other variables are
the same as described in Model 2. Here, to be consistent, we adopt the linear specification
without further parametric assumption on the error term as in Model 2. Given that the
dependent variables are binary, we conduct robustenss checks using Probit model in Section
6.
γ1 is the parameter of interest since it captures the change in the probability of upward
and downward transfers due to parental retirement. Note that we can only observe transfers
between parents and their biological children. So a caveat in interpreting our results is that
our regression sample only considers biological daughters and sons while excluding spouses5.
Table 4 reports our regression results from Model 3. Column 1 and 2 suggest that adult
children are 3.8 percent and 4.5 percent more likely to transfer money to and do housework
for parents after their parents retire. These findings are consistent with the social norm
in China where adult children are expected to take care of their parents. Column 3 and 4
report changes in the likelihood of transfers from parents to adult children. Parents are 3.9
and 5.6 percent more likely to transfer money to and or do housework for their children after
retirement. There are two possible explanations for such increases in downward transfer.
On the one hand, since adult children spend more time taking care of parents after the
parents retire, it is possible that parents compensate their children by giving small money
in exchange (Antonucci, 1990; Bernheim et al., 1985; Brandt and Deindl, 2013). On the
other hand, parents might use their own money when they do housework for their children.
For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that parents sometimes cover their children’s daily
expenses partially or pay for grocery shopping and transportation. One may point out that
that the magnitudes of coefficients for downward transfers are greater than those for upward
transfers. However, one should be cautious when making such comparisons, because we only
observe the extensive margin instead of the amount of transfers.
Next, we investigate if male and female children experience different changes in terms
5It is possible that parents attribute the efforts of children’s spouses to their own children, which might
lead to an upward or downward bias.
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Table 4: Transfer: Adult Child Give or Receive Help From Parents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ever transfer to parent Ever receive from parents
Dep. var. Money Housework Money Housework
Post 0.038** 0.045*** 0.039*** 0.056***
(0.018) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018)
Running -0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Running x Post 0.021*** -0.004 -0.004 0.023***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
Agec 0.009*** 0.002 -0.008*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant -0.241*** -0.018 0.240*** -0.290***
(0.036) (0.031) (0.065) (0.040)
R-squared 0.204 0.210 0.207 0.316
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
windows 5 5 5 5
Observations 4,773 4,773 4,773 4,773
Note: One unit of observation is an adult child. The dependent variables in column 1 and 2 are dummy
variables that take value one if the adult child transferred money to or did housework for the parent in the
past six months and zero otherwise. The dependent variables in column 3 and 4 are dummy variables that
take value one if the adult child received money or housework help from the parent in the past six months
and zero otherwise. “Post” is a dummy variable that takes value one if an adult’s parent has reached the
mandatory retirement age and zero otherwise. “Running” is the parent’s age minus the his or her corre-
sponding mandatory retirement age. “Ageit” is the age of the adult child i’s own age in year t. Year fixed
effects are included in all columns. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by adult
child birth year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
of intergenerational transfer after parental retirement. Namely, we re-run Model 3 for male
children and female children separately and report our results in Table 5. Columns 1 to
4 correspond to the time and monetary transfers to parents (upward transfers), whereas
Columns 5 to 8 correspond to the time and monetary from parents to adult children (down-
ward transfers). Interestingly, we observe very different patterns by gender. In columns 1,
we see that daughters are 4.4 percent more likely to transfer money to parents, whereas
column 2 suggests that sons are not statistically significantly more likely to provide financial
supports to parents. However, in columns 5 and 6, we observe that the probability of sons
receiving monetary transfer from parents after parental retirement increased significantly,
whereas for daughters this is not the case. The same pattern holds true for time transfers.
Daughters are 6.7 percent more likely to do housework for parents after their parents retire,
while sons’ increase in time transfer is almost statistically insignificant and half in size in
terms of magnitude. Meanwhile, sons are 8.4 percent more likely to receive help from parents
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Table 5: Adult Children Transfer: By Gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ever transfer to parent Ever receive from parents
Money Housework Money Housework
Dep. var. Daughter Son Daughter Son Daughter Son Daughter Son
Post 0.044* 0.035 0.067*** 0.035* 0.024 0.047*** 0.002 0.084***
(0.025) (0.022) (0.024) (0.018) (0.030) (0.015) (0.022) (0.021)
Running -0.012* 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.009**
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
Running x Post 0.020** 0.021*** -0.008 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 0.014 0.027***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.012) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.011) (0.008)
Agec 0.007*** 0.010*** -0.003 0.004*** -0.014*** -0.006*** 0.008*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant -0.184*** -0.265*** 0.091* -0.0734* 0.362*** 0.192*** -0.141*** -0.357***
(0.057) (0.038) (0.049) (0.036) (0.087) (0.055) (0.043) (0.047)
R-squared 0.177 0.226 0.217 0.206 0.216 0.210 0.217 0.388
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
windows 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Observations 1,631 3,131 1,631 3,131 1,631 3,131 1,631 3,131
Note: One unit of observation is an adult child. The dependent variables in column 1 (2) and 3 (4) are
dummy variables that take value one if the daughter (son) transferred money to, or did housework for
the parent in the past six months, zero otherwise. The dependent variables in column 5 (6) and 7 (8) are
dummy variables and take value one if the daughter (son) received money, or received housework help
from the parent in the past six months, zero otherwise. “Post” is a dummy variable that takes value one
if an adult’s parent has reached the mandatory retirement age and zero otherwise. “Running” is the par-
ent’s age minus the his or her corresponding mandatory retirement age. “Ageit” is the age of the adult
child i’s own age in year t. Year fixed effects are included in all columns. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses and clustered by adult child birth year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
while daughters are not.
The distinctive transfer patterns between daughters and sons can be explained by the
theory of social norm and gender role, as mentioned in Section 1. Regarding social norm,
it is a cultural tradition that Chinese parents favor sons over daughters (Li and Wu, 2011;
Zheng, 2015). Sons are considered as the “family name bearer”. Therefore, parents are more
likely to provide both time and monetary transfers to sons. The disproportional upward
transfer from daughters can be explained by the theory of gender role. Akerlof and Kranton
(2000) for example, suggests that the division of tasks within households is self-sustained
through gender norms and identity. The traditional role of Chinese women as homemakers,
therefore, can be sustained into the modern era. As an empirical evidence, Chen and Zhang
(2018) find that Chinese women devote significantly more hours into housework than men,
especially in care-giving. Therefore, the burden of care naturally falls on the shoulders of
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women as parents retire, resulting in the discrepancies by gender both in terms of labor reply
responses and changes in intergenerational transfer patterns.
In the next two subsections, we explore the explanations for the changes in intergenera-
tional transfer upon parental retirement and the disparate transfer patterns by gender.
5.2 Changes in Living Arrangement
One plausible cause of the increase in upward transfers and consequently the decrease in adult
children’s labor supply could be the changes in living arrangement after parental retirement.
It is possible that parents choose to live with their children after they retire and such change
could lead to changes in children’s time allocation (Bertrand et al., 2003).
Figure 3: Parental Age Density Distribution Around the Mandatory Cut-off
Note: This figure shows the age distribution around the mandatory retirement cut-off for individuals’ par-
ent without limiting to the ±5 windows. The x-axis is parental age relative to mandatory retirement age.
We do not find evidence for changes in living arrangement associated with parental
retirement. Figure 3 shows the age distribution of parents around the mandatory retirement
cut-off. It suggests that living arrangement does not suddenly change around the cut-off. If
parents do not live with their children before they retire and move in with their children after
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retirement, we would expect to see fewer observations on the left of the cutoff and more on
the right, as the first wave of the sample selection only covered parents that live with their
children. Our plot, however, shows that the density is rather smooth around the cut-off.
Thus, the changes in adult children’s labor supply and intergenerational transfer patterns
are not likely to be caused by living arrangement changes.
5.3 Changes in Parental Health
To understand why children increase their upward transfers after parental retirement, we
examine the changes in parents’ lives that might lead to an increased demand for money or
care. One key aspect is parental health. We use the the following model to detect significant
changes in parents’ self-rated health:
ParentalHealthpt = λ1Postpt + λ2Runningpt + λ3Postpt ×Runningpt +Xpt + η˜t + ν˜c (4)
where ParentalHealthpt includes 3 sets of outcome variables for a parent. The first set
includes binary indicators for each of the five levels of smoking intensity in the past month:
(1) never, (2) seldom, (3) frequent, (4) more frequent and (5) heavily smoke. The second set
is a dummy variable that takes value one if the parent drank more than 3 times in the past
week, and zero otherwise. The third set includes binary indicators for each of the five levels
of parental self-rated health: (1) very healthy, (2) moderately healthy, (3) neutral, (4) less
healthy and (5) very unhealthy. Xpt is parents’ smoking and drinking behaviors, which are
included here as control variables. The other regressors are the same as in model 2.
Columns 8 to 13 in Table A2 suggest no clear increase in parents’ risky health behaviors
in terms of smoking and alcohol use. We therefore turn to look at changes in parents’
subjective health ratings, which are reported in Table 6. Table 6 columns 1 to 5 report the
changes in the likelihood of considering oneself as very healthy to very unhealthy. Column 1
suggests that people are less likely to positively rate themselves as healthy after retirement,
after controlling for their drinking and smoking behaviors. The 4.3 percent drop in feeling
very healthy (rate as 1) is statistically significant at one percent level. Meanwhile, parents
are 4.4 percent more likely to consider themselves as very unhealthy. Thus finding confirms
our hypothesis that parents self-rated health are negatively impacted by retirement, which
increases their demand for attention and help from adult children.
Table 7 reports the change in hours by parental self-rated health. If a parent reports
as “Neutral”, “Less Healthy” or “Very Unhealthy”, he or she is considered as “unhealthy”,
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Table 6: Parental Self-rated Health and Retirement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. var.: Healthy Very Modest Neutral Less Unhealthy
Post -0.0430** -0.00209 0.00132 0.0214 0.0437**
(0.0209) (0.0183) (0.0161) (0.0208) (0.0192)
Running 0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Running x Post 0.009 -0.004 3.91e-06 -0.007 -0.005
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Smoke in recent 1 mon 0.0214 -0.0260 0.0585*** -0.00103 -0.0540***
(0.0139) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0148) (0.0171)
Drink more than 3 times a week -0.007 -0.014 0.003 0.035** 0.017
(0.015) (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.018)
Constant 0.381*** 0.453*** 0.0639*** 0.0761*** 0.299***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.015) (0.017) (0.023)
R-squared 0.288 0.130 0.190 0.038 0.100
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
windows 5 5 5 5 5
Observations 6,073 6,073 6,073 6,073 6,073
Note: One unit of observation is a parent. The dependent variables in column 1-5 are dummy variables
and take value one if one rates himself/herself as “Very Healthy”, “Moderately Healthy”, “Neutral”, “Less
Healthy” and “Very Unhealthy” respectively, and zero otherwise. “Post” is a dummy variable that takes
value one if an adult’s parent has reached the mandatory retirement age and zero otherwise. “Running” is
the parent’s age minus the his or her corresponding mandatory retirement age. “Smoke in recent 1 mon”
and “Drink more than 3 times a week” are parents’ risky healthy behaviors that are included here as con-
trol variables. Year fixed effects are included in all columns. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
otherwise “healthy”. Columns 1 and 3 show a large and significant drop in adult children’s
labor supply due to the poor self-rated health. If we look at people working in hired jobs
only, column 1 suggests that the average hours go down by 205.60 hours, which is 2.25 times
the effect on people with healthy parents, 91 hours in column 2. At the same time, column
2 suggests that the effect on people with healthy parents is not statistically significant.
This finding is also robust when we include self-employed people in columns 3 and 4. This
comparison of effects by parental self-rated health suggests that the overall negative impact
is driven by self-rated unhealthy parents, who requires more attention from adult children.
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Table 7: Adult Children Hours Worked By Parental Self-rated Health
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hired jobs Hired plus Self-employed
Dep. var.: Hours Unhealthy Healthy Unealthy Healthy
Post -205.6** -91.05 -130.5* -47.40
(83.61) (83.88) (74.26) (60.34)
Running 32.21* 20.25 0.834 14.35
(16.20) (21.76) (18.94) (21.81)
Running x Post -32.85 -40.48 31.38 -30.34
(24.28) (25.27) (29.57) (39.83)
Agec 32.74*** 53.54*** 6.514 10.80**
(7.276) (6.866) (4.356) (4.317)
R-squared 0.169 0.133 0.159 0.102
windows 5 5 5 5
Observations 2,468 3,849 1,707 2,281
Note: One unit of observation is an adult child. The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is the an-
nual hours for hired jobs. The dependent variable in Columns 3 and 4 is the annual hours of hired job
plus self-employment hours. “Unhealthy” takes value one if the parent’s self-rated health is “Neutral”,
“Less Healthy” or “Very Unhealthy”. “Healthy” takes value one if the parent’s self-rated health is “Very
Healthy” or “Moderately Healthy”. “Post” is a dummy variable that takes value one if an adult’s first-
to-retire parent has reached the mandatory retirement age and zero otherwise. “Running” is the first-to-
retire parent’s age minus the his or her corresponding mandatory retirement age. “Ageit” is the age of
the adult child i’s own age in year t. Year fixed effects are included in all columns. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses and clustered by adult child birth year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
6 Robustness Checks
We perform three robustness checks for our baseline estimates from the following perspec-
tives. First, we check if our estimates of the reduction in adult children’s labor supply are
affected by the anticipation effects described in Section 4 by performing a set of “donut-hole”
RD regressions. Second, we check if our results are driven by parents who retire early because
of health issues. Third, we specify an alternative time window (± 7 years) with respect to
the mandatory retirement cutoff in Section 6.3 to check if the significant reduction in labor
supply still remains. Lastly, given that the dependent variables for transfer and parental
self-rated health are binary variables, we replace the linear probability model with a Probit
model and check if the estimated effects are sensitive to model specifications in Section 6.4.
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6.1 Donut-Hole Design
Since retirement is anticipated, it is possible that people adjust their behavior ahead of time.
For example, adult children may increase their labor supply ahead of time in anticipation
of their parents’ retirement and the potential drop in family income. This will result in an
upward bias in our estimate of the labor supply reduction at cut-off. On the other hand,
family may choose to reallocate the duties among household members in anticipation of
changes in family life. For example, knowing that his or her parent is retiring soon, the child
may start to ease out of his/her current role at work to prepare for the transition to a more
family-centered role. This will lead to a downward bias in our estimate of the labor supply
reduction, especially for women, since they are often the ones expected to transition early
into a family role.
To check if our RD estimates are sensitive to anticipation effects, we implement a “donut-
hole” RD design. The main idea is to exclude the few observations just above or below the
cut-off. One drawback of this methodology is that there is no clear consensus regarding the
optimal size of the donut hole. We choose to exclude observations one year above and below
the cut-off.
Figure 4 graphically shows that the sizable drop in labor supply still remains after we
exclude adult children whose parents are one year above and below the mandatory retirement
age. In panel (a), we plot adult children’s annual hours of labor supply against the running
variable. To partial out own age effect, we also plot the residuals of annual working hours as
in model 1. Similar to our main results in Section 4.2, the drop in adult children’s working
hours remains significant around the cut-off. Table 8 reports the regression results using
our donut-hole sample. Column 1 suggests that there is on average an 152-hour drop in
adult children’s annual working hours when we only consider waged jobs. This effect is
larger than the corresponding RD estimate (82.72 hours). When we include people who are
self-employed in Column 2, the main effect remains significant, and is also larger than the
RD estimates (77 hours). This greater effect suggests that anticipation effects lead to an
overall downward bias in our estimate, meaning that the household duty reallocation effect
dominates the saving-up for retirement effect.
6.2 Early retirement due to health issues?
If parents are sick and choose to retire early, then the impact of parental retirement on
adult’s labor supply could be endogenous. To check if our result is driven by the sick parents
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(a) Annual hours
(b) Residual annual hours
Figure 4: Robustness: Donut-Hole Design. The x-axis is the parent’s age normalized so
that zero represents the mandatory retirement threshold. In panel (a), the y-axis is the adult
children’s annual hours of labor supply. In panel (b), the y-axis is the residual hours of adult
children’s annual labor supply after controlling for own age effect. Dots are means in 0.5-year
bins. Lines are from separate above- and below-threshold linear regressions.
who retire early, we exclude a) adults whose parents retire earlier than the mandatory age
(11 percent of the sample), and b) adults whose parents retire earlier than the mandatory
age and in bad objective health condition (smoking and drinking heavily, be in hospital in
the year) (1 percent of the sample). Table 9 column 1 reports the baseline result in Table
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Table 8: Robustness: Donut-Hole RD Design
(1) (2)
Dep. var.: Hours Hired jobs Hired plus SE
Post -152.1*** -99.32*
(53.67) (53.65)
Running 26.31* 7.431
(13.15) (15.68)
Running x Post -34.90 2.768
(23.76) (24.87)
Agec 41.58*** 13.56***
(3.830) (3.088)
Constant 160.7 2,030***
(142.3) (102.2)
R-squared 0.141 0.008
Windows 5-year with 1-year hole 5-year with 1-year hole
Observations 9,209 5,014
Note: One unit of observation is an adult child. This table reports the robustness check for baseline model
excluding observations ±1 year around the cut-off. The dependent variable in Column 1 is adult children’s
annual hours of labor supply in hired jobs. The dependent variable in Column 2 is adult children’s annual
hours of labor supply in hired jobs and hours reported as self-employed. ‘Post” is a dummy variable that
takes value one if an adult’s parent has reached the mandatory retirement age and zero otherwise. “Run-
ning” is the parent’s age minus the his or her corresponding mandatory retirement age. “Ageit” is the age
of the adult child i’s own age in year t. Year fixed effects are included in all columns. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses and clustered by adult child birth year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2 column 2 using the entire sample. Table 9 columns 2 and 3 report the estimates when
excluding people whose parents retire early and sick and retire early, respectively. Table 9
shows that the negative result on hours still holds. So this relieves the concern of reverse
causality due to early (sick) retirement.
6.3 Alternative time window
As discussed in the sample construction subsection in Section 3, there is no statistical or
economic consensus on the choice of the window size in RD design. To check the robustness
of our results, we consider an alternative time window of ±7 years around the mandatory
retirement cut-off for parents.
Table 10 reports the baseline estimates for Model 2 using our ±7 years sample. The
drop in adult children’s labor supply at the cut-off remains statistically significant. The
magnitudes are also consistent with our baseline results.
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Table 9: Robustness: Excluding Early Retirement
(1) (2) (3)
Excluding Excluding
Dep. var.: Hours Hired jobs early retirement early and sick retirement
Post -81.50*** -91.88*** -77.65**
(27.63) (28.17) (28.73)
Running -2.86 4.04 -4.94
(10.82) (11.06) (10.96)
Running x Post 14.86 -0.759 17.15
(17.67) (20.58) (17.37)
Agec 12.47*** 15.13*** 12.25***
(2.26) (2.42) (2.25)
Constant 2,041*** 1,961*** 2,040***
(75.90) (84.32) (74.87)
Observations 7,573 5,319 7,512
R-squared 0.103 0.097 0.104
windows 5 5 5
Note: One unit of observation is an adult child. This table reports the robustness check for baseline
model excluding observations. Column 2 excludes adults whose parent retire earlier than the mandatory
age. Column 3 excludes adults whose parent retire earlier than the mandatory age and in bad objective
health condition (smoking and drinking heavily, be in hospital in the year). The dependent variable in all
columns is adult children’s annual hours of labor supply in hired jobs. ‘Post” is a dummy variable that
takes value one if an adult’s parent has reached the mandatory retirement age and zero otherwise. “Run-
ning” is the parent’s age minus the his or her corresponding mandatory retirement age. “Ageit” is the age
of the adult child i’s own age in year t. Year fixed effects are included in all columns. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses and clustered by adult child birth year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
6.4 Alternative model specification
Since the dependent variables in Model 3 and Model 4 are binary variables, we check if our
results are sensitive to model specification. In particular, we re-run the regressions in Model
3 and Model 4 using Probit model.
Table 11 reports the estimated marginal effects of parental retirement on the probability
of giving (receiving) transfers to (from) parents with Probit model, using our original ±5
years sample. The estimates are slightly larger in magnitude than the effects in 4 and are
still significant.
Table 12 reports the marginal effect estimates using Probit model for gender-specific
transfer probabilities. The coefficients are largely consistent with our estimates in Table 5.
In columns 5 to 8, we still find disparate transfer patterns for daughters and sons in terms
of receiving help from parents. Columns 1 to 4 compare the probabilities of providing help
to parents by gender. Although the probability of sons providing upward transfers after
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Table 10: Robustness: Seven-year window
(1) (2)
Dep. var.: Hours Hired jobs Hired plus SE
Post -113.20*** -85.05***
(32.15) (28.26)
Running 14.98*** 1.45
(5.41) (6.12)
Running x Pose -17.64* 9.255
(9.86) (8.08)
Agec 37.09*** 11.70***
(3.58) (2.36)
Constant 205.80 2,045***
(135.20) (78.19)
R-squared 0.156 0.099
windows 7 7
Observations 15,010 10,031
Note: One unit of observation is an adult child. This table reports the robustness check for baseline model
using ±7 years as an alternative window. The dependent variable in Column 1 is adult children’s annual
hours of labor supply in hired jobs. The dependent variable in Column 2 is adult children’s annual hours
of labor supply in hired jobs and hours reported as self-employed. ‘Post” is a dummy variable that takes
value one if an adult’s parent has reached the mandatory retirement age and zero otherwise. “Running”
is the parent’s age minus the his or her corresponding mandatory retirement age. “Ageit” is the age of
the adult child i’s own age in year t. Year fixed effects are included in all columns. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses and clustered by adult child birth year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
parental retirement is higher using Probit model compared to linear probability model, the
magnitude is still smaller than that of daughters. Thus, the disparate transfer patterns
between male and female children remain robust to alternative model specification.
Table 13 reports the estimated marginal effects of retirement on parents’ self-rated health
using an Ordered Probit model. Column 1 to 4 report changes in the likelihood of considering
oneself as “very healthy” to “less healthy”, using “very unhealthy” as the baseline. Column
1 suggests that parents are less likely to positively rate themselves as healthy after retirement
after controlling for their risky health behaviors (drinking and smoking ). The 4.4 percent
drop in feeling very healthy (rate as 1) is very close to the corresponding estimate in column
1 of Table 6. Estimates in column 2 and 4 are similar to those in Table 6 as well. Thus,
our estimates of changes in parents’ self-rated health are also robust to alternative model
specification.
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Table 11: Robustness: Transfer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ever transfer to parent Ever receive from parents
Dep. var. Money Housework Money Housework
Post 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.047*** 0.073***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017)
Running 0.000 0.003 0.002 -0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Running x Post 0.011*** -0.005 -0.002 0.013***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Agec 0.009*** 0.003* -0.006*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Log Likelihood -2430.647 -2397.704 -2150.9 -2612.681
Year FE yes yes yes yes
windows 5 5 5 5
Observations 4,773 4,773 4,773 4,773
Note: This table is the robustness check for Table 4 using Probit model. Marginal effects are reported in
the first row, and standard errors are reported in parentheses. One unit of observation is an adult child.
The dependent variables in column 1 and 2 are dummy variables that take value one if the adult child
transferred money to or did housework for the parent in the past six months and zero otherwise. The de-
pendent variables in column 3 and 4 are dummy variables that take value one if the adult child received
money or housework help from the parent in the past six months and zero otherwise. “Post” is a dummy
variable that takes value one if an adult’s parent has reached the mandatory retirement age and zero
otherwise. “Running” is the parent’s age minus the his or her corresponding mandatory retirement age.
“Ageit” is the age of the adult child i’s own age in year t. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and
clustered by adult child birth year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
29
Table 12: Robustness: Transfer By Gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ever transfer to parent Ever receive from parents
Money Housework Money Housework
Dep. var. Daughter Son Daughter Son Daughter Son Daughter Son
Post 0.063*** 0.050** 0.072*** 0.045** 0.031 0.055*** 0.019 0.101***
(0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.017) (0.029) (0.017) (0.022) (0.019)
Running -0.012 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.006
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Running x Post 0.015* 0.006 -0.007 -0.005 0.002 -0.003 0.006 0.018**
(0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007)
Agec 0.006*** 0.010*** -0.001*** 0.004*** -0.011*** -0.004*** 0.008*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Log Likelihood -779.439 -1625.484 -849.65 -1535.977 -739.102 -1391.821 -868.843 -1661.932
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
windows 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Observations 1,631 3,131 1,631 3,131 1,631 3,131 1,631 3,131
Note: This table is the robustness check for Table 5 using Probit model. Marginal effects are reported
in the first row, and standard errors are reported in parentheses. One unit of observation is an adult
child. The dependent variables in column 1 (2) and 3 (4) are dummy variables that take value one if the
daughter (son) transferred money to, or did housework for the parent in the past six months, zero other-
wise. The dependent variables in column 5 (6) and 7 (8) are dummy variables and take value one if the
daughter (son) received money, or received housework help from the parent in the past six months, zero
otherwise. “Post” is a dummy variable that takes value one if an adult’s parent has reached the manda-
tory retirement age and zero otherwise. “Running” is the parent’s age minus the his or her corresponding
mandatory retirement age. “Ageit” is the age of the adult child i’s own age in year t. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses and clustered by adult child birth year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 13: Robustness: Parental Self-rated Health and Retirement using Ordered Probit Model
Dep. var. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Self-rate as: More Healthy Moderate Neutral Less
Post -0.044*** 0.000 0.006** 0.039**
(0.019) (0.000) (0.002) (0.017)
Running 0.004 0.000 -0.001 -0.004
(0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004)
Running x Post 0.008 0.000 -0.001 -0.007
(0.006) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006)
Smoke in recent 1 mon 0.032** 0.000 -0.004** -0.027**
(0.014) (0.001) (0.002) (0.012)
Drink more than 3 times a week -0.011 0.000 0.001 0.010
(0.012) (0.000) (0.002) (0.011)
0.360 0.458 0.361 0.360
Log likelihood = -7181.432
N = 6073
Note: This table is the robustness check for Table 6 with ordered probit model. Marginal effects are re-
ported in the first row, and standard errors are reported in parentheses.
One unit of observation is a parent. The dependent variables in column 1-4 are indicator variables of
self-rated health: “Very Healthy” (value 1), “Moderately Healthy”(value 2), “Neutral”(value 3), “Less
Healthy” (value 4). “Very Unhealthy” is used as the baseline. “Post” is a dummy variable that takes value
one if an adult’s parent has reached the mandatory retirement age and zero otherwise. “Running” is the
parent’s age minus the his or her corresponding mandatory retirement age. “Smoke in recent 1 mon” and
“Drink more than 3 times a week” are parents’ risky healthy behaviors that are included here as control
variables. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the impact of parental retirement on adult children’s labor supply and
investigates the mechanisms, namely the changes in time and monetary transfers between
parents and adult children due to parental retirement. We exploit the exogenous mandatory
retirement age in China and use a regression discontinuity (RD) design to estimate the
intent-to-treat effect of parents reaching mandatory retirement age. We find a significant
reduction in adult children’s annual hours of labor supply by 3 to 4 percent. The negative
effect is especially pronounced for female children.
We find that the parents’ self-rated health also experience a sizable drop as they pass
the mandatory retirement age. The negative effect is driven by self-rated unhealthy parents.
With a lack of formal eldercare provision, parents rely more on adult children and demand
more care from them when they are transitioning into retired life. Our results indeed suggest
that the upward transfer from children to parents, both in terms of money and in terms of
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time, increased significantly upon parental retirement. In addition, we find that daughters
are more likely to provide money and help to parents while receiving less support from
parents compared to sons. This showcases the barrier of traditional gender role and social
norm imposes on Chinese women’s endeavors in balancing market labor supply and home
production.
Our study has two major policy implications. First of all, since formal elderly care and
assistance from family members are close substitutes, central and local government should
devote more resources into building affordable elderly care facilities so as to alleviate the
burden on and career costs to adult children with retired parents. Second, since social
norm and traditional gender role dictate Chinese women as the main care-givers, workplace
amenities such as flexible working hours and “elderly care days” will help female employees
balance the demands from work and family.
Two main limitations exist in our study. First of all, due to the limited scale of the
survey and the fact that many respondents failed to report working hours, the number of
observations included in our final sample is not large enough for further dissection. For
example, with sufficiently large sample size, we could have compared the effects of father’s
retirement to mother’s retirement, or parent’s retirement to in-law’s retirement. With our
sample size, however, the statistical power will be jeopardized. Second, we only observe
the extensive margin of inter-generational transfers, not the number of hours or monetary
amounts. This limits our ability to quantify the size of upward and downward transfers and
the statistical significance of changes in size. Therefore, more research will be required in
order to understand the true career cost of parental retirement to adult children and the
details of the underlying mechanisms.
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Appendix
Table A1: Balance Test for Missing Hours
Non-missing hours missing Hours
Mean SD N Mean SD N Diff. t-stat
Female 0.32 0.47 9009 0.30 0.46 4065 -0.02∗ -1.74
Age 27.59 5.00 9009 29.25 5.51 4065 1.67∗∗∗ 17.07
Urban Area 0.47 0.50 8775 0.37 0.48 4048 -0.10∗∗∗ -10.60
Married 0.40 0.49 9009 0.32 0.47 4065 -0.07∗∗∗ -8.19
Years of schooling 10.46 4.00 8623 9.00 4.44 4050 -1.46∗∗∗ -18.54
Income 19992.77 112110.89 8947 4327.64 13988.20 3998 -15665.13∗∗∗ -8.80
Asset (thsd yuan) 310.10 531.81 8762 181.78 392.48 3998 -128.32∗∗∗ -13.65
N.kid under age 1 0.05 0.24 9009 0.06 0.25 4065 0.01 1.18
N.kid age 1-2 0.21 0.45 9009 0.22 0.46 4065 0.02∗ 1.89
N.kid age 3-5 0.27 0.53 9009 0.38 0.62 4065 0.10∗∗∗ 9.55
N.kid age 6-16 0.36 0.66 9009 0.51 0.77 4065 0.15∗∗∗ 11.34
Parent Age (recode) 59.78 2.95 9009 60.33 3.03 4065 0.55∗∗∗ 9.73
Parent Retired 0.26 0.44 6928 0.31 0.46 2778 0.05∗∗∗ 5.34
Post 0.51 0.50 9009 0.58 0.49 4065 0.07∗∗∗ 7.82
Note: This table reports the characteristics of adult children with and without missing working hours.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
(g) (h)
Figure A1: Validity Test: We plot the change in different covariates of parents below and
above the mandatory retirement cutoff. (a) describes the fraction of female; (b) and (c) describe the
fraction of individuals who are married and widowed respectively; (d) describes the years of schooling;
(e) describes the number of adult children in the family; (f) describes the fraction of individuals whose
parents are covered by pension. (g) and (h) describe the fraction of individuals who are frequent smokers
and alcohol users respectively. 37
Table A2: Covariates Smooth at Age Cutoff: Parents
Marital status Smoking
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (20)
VARIABLES Never Married Cohabitation Divorced Widowed schooling N. children No Seldom Frequent More frequent Heavy Alcoholic Pension
Post -0.001 0.019* -0.001 -0.0003 -0.017* -0.112 -0.099* -0.009 0.003 -0.021** -0.003 0.015 0.005 0.013
(0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) (0.114) (0.054) (0.019) (0.024) (0.010) (0.017) (0.012) (0.026) (0.012)
Running 0.0003 -0.010*** 0.001* -0.0003 0.009*** 0.013 0.013 0.009 -0.007 0.001 0.002 -0.004* -0.008 -0.004
(0.0003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.032) (0.016) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003)
Post x Running -0.0004 0.0003 -0.002** 0.001 0.001 -0.043 -0.008 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 0.003 0.002 -1.62e-06 0.007
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.037) (0.027) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.012) (0.005)
Constant 0.002** 0.926*** 0.004* 0.005* 0.062*** 2.643*** 1.980*** 0.422*** 0.203*** 0.090*** 0.145*** 0.067*** 0.193*** 0.913***
(0.001) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.093) (0.050) (0.024) (0.024) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) (0.034) (0.011)
Observations 6,073 6,073 6,073 6,073 6,073 6,073 3,421 6,073 6,073 6,073 6,073 6,073 6,073 6,073
R-squared 0.002 0.009 0.002 0.000 0.010 0.026 0.075 0.533 0.045 0.112 0.226 0.114 0.018 0.025
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
windows 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Note: This table reports the change in covariates of parents below and above the mandatory retirement cutoff. Here the parent refers to the
”first-to” for “first” retired parent in the household.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure A2: Validity Test: We plot the change in different covariates of adult children below
and above parental age centered around the mandatory retirement cutoff. (a) describes the
fraction of female adult children; (b) and (c) describe the fraction of individuals who are never married
and married respectively; (d) describes the years of schooling; (e) describes the number of children in
the family; and, (f) describes the fraction of individuals whose parents are covered by pension.
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Table A3: Covariates Smooth at Age Cutoff: Adult Children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Marital status N. Children Parents covered by
Dep. Var Female Never Married Married Cohabitation Divorced Years of Schooling Total N. Age < 1 Age 1-3 Age 3-5 N. Age ≥ 6 Pension
Post 0.005 -0.017 0.016 0.002 -0.003 -0.082 -0.036 -0.004 -0.017 -0.039 0.025 -0.001
(0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.158) (0.041) (0.020) (0.037) (0.029) (0.036) (0.013)
Running 0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.004 0.012 0.002 0.007 0.010 -0.006 0.003
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.037) (0.011) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.004)
Running x Post 0.00418 0.007 -0.007 -0.001 0.000 -0.087* -0.007 -0.003 -0.015** -0.010 0.019 -0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.045) (0.013) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.015) (0.006)
Constant 0.784*** 1.578*** -0.548*** 0.023*** -0.053*** 11.37*** 1.024*** 0.442*** 1.032*** 0.577*** -1.026*** 0.804***
(0.048) (0.090) (0.092) (0.007) (0.008) (0.784) (0.087) (0.039) (0.074) (0.111) (0.188) (0.027)
Observations 11,194 11,193 11,193 11,193 11,193 10,717 6,897 6,897 6,897 6,897 6,897 8,438
R-squared 0.013 0.281 0.248 0.002 0.012 0.014 0.013 0.031 0.050 0.007 0.136 0.441
windows 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Note: This table reports the change in covariates of adult children below and above parental age centered around the mandatory retirement
cutoff. Here the parent refers to the ”first-to” for “first” retired parent in the household.
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